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ABSTRACT 
SOCAFRICA, a theater special operations command (TSOC), executes the full spectrum 
of Special Operations in complex environments, emphasizing the indirect approach to 
operations. The operational emphasis on preventive activities in a steady-state 
environment provides access, awareness, and options to the U.S. and its partners in the 
event of crises. Special Operation Forces (SOF) have doubled in size over the past 
decade, and SOCOM has built tremendous capabilities in that time, but TSOC’s—the 
regional-level SOF organizations—have not shared in these capability increases. Because 
TSOC’s are under-manned and under-resourced, they are not capable of effectively 
applying the indirect approach to achieve long-term effects for Geographic Combatant 
Commanders and Chiefs of Mission. Change is needed to improve TSOC effectiveness. 
This thesis will analyze the organizational shortfalls of TSOC’s through the lens of the 
newest TSOC, SOCAFRICA, and will examine USSOCOM’s Global SOF Network 
concept which intends to provide authorities, capabilities, and resources to TSOC’s to 
make them the force of choice at the regional level. SOCOM has established a road map 
to optimize TSOC’s. However, the GSN alone is not capable of implementing the 
necessary changes; it will require commitment and continued support from the individual 
services, the GCC’s, and from Congress.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW  
Much like Goldwater Nichols accomplished for our Armed Forces two 
decades ago, we should assess what new or revised authorities are needed 
to enhance interagency coordination, and build a more joint and integrated 
process.1 
       Gen. Peter Pace- 2007 
      Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 
The U.S. military recognizes the need for enduring engagement across the globe 
as a means to address today’s threats, and further, it understands the importance of 
synchronization among U.S. Government (USG) organizations. The Commander of the 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has said that Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) can help achieve the integration of Diplomacy, Development, 
and Defense (3D) efforts through the indirect approach to operations with forward 
presence and enduring engagement in regions where the Department of State (DoS) has 
primacy, also called Title 22 environments.2  The current security environment has 
demonstrated an increased demand on dwindling resources, persistent regional instability, 
empowered non-state actors, the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and failed states.  “Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations. . 
. have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used 
to conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power 
to full advantage.”3  These security challenges present an opportunity to apply all 
elements of national power to counter threats to security.   
                                                 
1 General Peter Pace, in his Posture Statement to Congress, 2007.  Taken from Christian M. Averett et 
al., “An Analysis of Special Operations Command-South's Distributive Command and Control Concept 
(Master’s Thesis, Monterey, Calif: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007),  7.                                                          
      2 William H. McRaven, Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of the 
Commander, United States Special Operations Command, before the 112th Congress, March 6, 2012.                                                 
3 Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towell, "Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for 
Missions Abroad Key Proposals and Issues for Congress," Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, December, 22, 2011, http://www.cq.com/pdf/crsreports-4008205, (accessed 2 Oct, 2012), 1.  
 2 
National security interests in recent years are driven by increasingly complex 
threats and problems around the globe, most of which are not solvable through military 
activities alone. Michele Malvesti states in her report titled To Serve the Nation: U.S. 
Special Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict, that SOF’s abilities to address future 
threats have outpaced policies to optimally employ SOF, and that therefore, it is 
important that SOF provides policymakers with innovative options to address future 
national security threats:4   
Today, the SOF community has invested in strategic and operational 
relationships across departments and agencies in Washington. . . . In many 
ways, SOF are now serving as both a nucleus of action and as the center 
for a community of practice, frequently driving interagency discussions on  
. . . national security threats and challenges.5   
But at the regional, theater level of SOF organizations, these relationships have 
not been codified, nor have the requirements for regional SOF structure been 
institutionalized. This is relevant because National Security Reform issues focus on the 
need for more a coherent and consistent whole of government approach for the 
instruments of national power. SOF’s investment over the past decade at the strategic and 
tactical level of SOF capabilities merits similar emphasis at the regional level.   
While SOF has adapted to the complexities of the past decade, organizational 
modifications at the regional level have not kept up. A Theater Special Operations 
Command (TSOC), the regional level SOF organization, is designed to maintain an 
enduring presence and develop long-term relationships in their region, including with 
other U.S. government departments in a region. But regional SOF are chronically 
understaffed and not optimally organized to achieve this in complex operating 
environments due to legacy command and control structures that impede 
synchronization—in part a result of each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) 
lacking expertise in the strategic employment and resourcing of SOF at the regional level. 
                                                 
4 Michele L. Malvesti, "To Serve the Nation: US Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent 
Conflict," Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C., June 2010, 27. 
5 Ibid, 4. 
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This reduced effectiveness, at a time when GCC’s rely on SOF more, requires 
changes to the authorities, capabilities, and resources for the TSOC’s, which will enable 
them to better achieve theater strategies through whole-of-government collaboration. 
With a leaner military, SOF will be asked to remain capable of meeting a wider range of 
security requirements.6  To help achieve national security objectives, USSOCOM intends 
to better integrate SOF across the interagency (IA) by reorganizing regional SOF over the 
next several years through a concept called the Global SOF Network (GSN).   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the organizational shortfalls of the 
TSOC’s through the lens of SOCAFRICA, and examine the implications of 
USSOCOM’s Global SOF Network concept on the future role of SOF at the regional 
level. National Security policy is executed at the regional level, most prominently in the 
form of the Department of State’s country focused embassies and the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) Geographic Combatant Commands. But the mismatch of directive 
authority within the USG—at the National Security Council level and then again at the 
bilateral-focused embassy country team—creates a large gap in the regional level, in 
which the GCC stands out as a large DoD entity trying to accomplish its mission.7  As 
such, our work seeks to illustrate how the SOCOM GSN will improve those regional 
SOF organizational issues that prevent better synchronization in areas where the DoS has 
primacy.  
The thesis will examine the required authorities and capabilities SOCOM needs to 
implement changes to improve the overall effectiveness of the TSOC to operate in 
steady-state environment. Specifically, our work will examine six aspects: The TSOC’s 
ability to sustain enduring engagements with partners; The lack of personnel expertise to 
plan regional SOF campaigns; Degraded ability to conduct distributed command and 
control (DC2) and lack of assigned forces; Inflexible logistics support mechanisms; 
                                                 
6 Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 2012 Army Posture Statement., 2012, 
https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/pages/StrategicContext.aspx, 
accessed 5 August, 2012.                                                   
7 Peter Phillips and Charles Corcoran, "Harnessing America's Power: A U.S. National Security 
Structure for the 21st Century," Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 63, 4th qtr. 2011, 42.                       
 4 
Complexity in authorities and funding; and synchronization of SOF plans with other 
regional entities. 
Africa and the Special Operations Command- Africa (SOCAFRICA) will be the 
case study through which the aforementioned improvements will be examined within the 
context of a steady-state environment. SOCAFRICA was selected because it is the 
newest TSOC, only four years old, and as part of the U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM), was deliberately conceived to focus on the whole-of government approach. 
Further, Africa is a region with increased U.S. strategic emphasis, but more importantly it 
is a region where the full range of security challenges exists.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis topic is inductive in nature, using background research on current 
policy and plans to gain an understanding of the National Security environment and how 
SOF organizations are adapting to changes within it. Chapter two provides an explanation 
of the GSN as it applies to TSOC improvement and synchronization, relying primarily on 
existing draft concepts within SOCOM and interviews with SOCOM staff. Next, Chapter 
Three will characterize the steady-state environment, providing a focus for future 
operations and highlighting the importance of lexicon and common understanding of 
terms, roles, and capabilities across U.S. Government organizations. It will analyze the 
regional level of operations—the level at which TSOC’s conduct campaign planning. 
Specifically, it will cover the indirect approach to Special Operations (SO) at the regional 
level; the TSOC as the regional SOF organization, and Africa as a complex steady-state 
environment. Chapter four is the case study examining SOCAFRICA and the SOCOM 
NCR. The case study will identify major organizational shortfalls of the TSOC, tying 
these and the organizations to the steady-state environment and to the synchronization 
needed for coherent U.S. foreign policy. This chapter will rely extensively on 
SOCAFRICA concepts, guidance, and interviews with staff members from SOCAFRICA 
and SOCOM. The case study will help identify implications and recommendations, 
which may be applicable to other regional SOF or DoD organizations. The final chapter 
will examine the GSN and its proposed solutions to improve the capabilities and 
 5 
synchronization of regional SOF organizations. Additionally, our work addresses 
implications of the GSN on the Services to generate further analysis and research.  
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II. THE CALL FOR CHANGE 
Indeed, as we end today’s wars, we will focus on a broader range of 
challenges and opportunities. . . . As a new generation across the Middle 
East and North Africa demands their universal rights, we are supporting 
political and economic reform and deepening partnerships to ensure 
regional security. . . . we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and 
ready for the full range of contingencies.8 
      President Barack Obama-Jan 2012 
      Defense Strategic Guidance 
A. THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK 
This chapter will provide an overview of SOCOM’s Global SOF Network. It will 
examine efforts to improve the regional level of SOF by adding capabilities to the 
TSOC’s, and  improve SOF synchronization within the interagency by adding a staff 
element in Washington, D.C., called SOCOM National Capital Region (NCR). This 
thesis focuses on two of the four GSN lines of effort, explained below.   
Since 9/11, U.S. Special Operations has experienced staggering growth and 
operations tempo—nearly doubling in manpower, tripling in budget, and quadrupling in 
deployments9—while TSOC’s were largely ignored over the time that SOCOM grew the 
force, its capabilities, and its headquarters. Despite the overall growth of SOF, TSOC’s 
do not have adequate capabilities, authorities, or capacity to plan and executed full-
spectrum operations in steady-state environments. Although they are Special Operations 
Commands, there is currently no formal command relationship with SOCOM—TSOC’s 
are the special operations subordinate unified commands of the GCC. The role and 
command relationships of TSOC’s are unclear within DoD, and even DoS does not 
recognize their role except in a combat theater.10   
                                                 
8 Leon E. Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
Washington, D.C: Dept. of Defense, January 2012, 1.                                   
9 Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress”, 
Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2011, 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=682416, (accessed 10 October, 2012), summary.                                
10 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Commander's Estimate on Expanding Global SOF 
Network,” MacDill, AFB: Special Operations Command, November 4, 2011, B1.                                  
 8 
As a result, the SOCOM enterprise grew while at the regional level the ability to 
C2 SOF and collaborate with the IA in steady-state environments remained static. 
SOCOM, and SOF in general, focused the majority of its efforts and resources on the 
most visible aspects of its capabilities—the direct approach to counterterrorism (CT).11  
CT was and still is the priority effort of the United States, and SOCOM was given 
responsibility for synchronizing the military’s CT efforts. Therefore, SOCOM 
headquarters used resources in an attempt to become an executive level warfighting HQ. 
This created a cumbersome organization—a misallocation of resources since SOCOM 
does not C2 most deployed SOF. Figure 1 on the left depicts the skewed growth, creating 
a top-heavy organization. Based on its overwhelming CT focus, SOCOM had little 
incentive to invest in the TSOC’s. In essence, SOCOM focused its growth in the areas 
over which it had control, and since TSOC’s are subordinate to GCC’s, it was difficult to 
resource the TSOC’s congruently with SOF growth.   
      Top heavy SOCOM since 2001    Preferred decentralized SOF organizations           
         
Figure 1.   Growth of SOCOM since 2001 (From Averett et al., “Approaches to the 
GWOT.”)12                                                                 
In 2011 SOCOM looked at how SOF, specifically SOCAFRICA, should be 
presented to the GCC for operations in a steady-state environment. Among its findings 
were the following observations: First, while overall mission success depends on 
collaboration and unity of effort between SOF and other stakeholders, SOF’s roles and 
                                                 
11 Linda Robinson, "The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture," Foreign Affairs, 
Nov/Dec 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138232/linda-robinson/the-future-of-special-
operations, (accessed 15 November, 2012).                   
12 Averett et al., “An Analysis of SOCSOUTH,” 19,20.   
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capabilities at the strategic and operational levels are not well understood by other USG 
agencies.13  Second, a lack of common planning processes within the IA negatively 
impacts collaboration. Further, the TSOC’s were originally established as warfighting 
organizations, but in the expanded role of sustained operations in a steady-state 
environment, they do not have the manpower and resources to carry out their mission.14 
After assuming command of USSOCOM in 2011, Admiral McRaven set out to 
address how SOF should be organized to meet future security challenges. Recent 
Presidential and DoD strategic guidance has called for a downsizing of the military, and 
to creatively use smaller elements in its global efforts.15  SOCOM’s reassessment 
determined it needed to increase its focus on the indirect approach to operations, in 
particular to how SOF plans and conducts “enduring engagements and distributed 
operations when the U.S. chief-of-mission (COM) has primacy.”16  The indirect 
approach is described as including “empowering host nation forces, providing 
appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations.”17  It is 
intended to be part of long term efforts to generate host nation security force capability 
and promote rule of law. This reassessment specifically means addressing command 
relationships and resourcing for the TSOC to provide responsive, sustained SOF support 
at the regional level.18  Figure 1 on the right depicts a less top heavy SOF structure, with 
the majority of resources ideally at the TSOC’s.    
While global threats continue to evolve and become more complex, all elements 
of U.S national power must be applied to meet national strategic guidance. Recognizing 
the need for an integrated approach to solve problems in complex, steady-state 
environments, the GSN seeks changes in authorities, command relationships, and 
                                                 
13 USSOCOM J7/9-F, Wargame Branch, “Global Scout 2011 Limited Objective Experiment 2 Final 
Report” Team CACI, USSOCOM, Tampa FL, August 2011, 6. 
14 Ibid. 8. 
15 Panetta., Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.  
16 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Concept of Operations for the Global Special Operations 
Forces Network,” Draft, USSOCOM, Tampa, FL, Oct 2012, ii.                          
17 McRaven, Posture Statement, 6.      
18 Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress 
June 26, 2012,” Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., June 26, 2012, 2.                            
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organizational structure to enable TSOC’s to be the primary regional link to help GCC 
and Chiefs of Mission achieve their objectives.19  By seeking changes which will affect 
the way SOF is structured, assigned, and deployed in support of GCC, the GSN 
represents one of the most significant and innovative attempts at reform in DoD since 
Goldwater Nichols.20   
To ensure SOF is “agile, flexible, and ready,” the GSN will better integrate SOF 
with GCC, USG agencies, and non-U.S. partners, by increasing SOF’s forward posture, 
expanding TSOC effectiveness, improving interagency relationships, and building partner 
capacity.21  However, given the downsizing in the military and limits to budget growth, 
the GSN is not an attempt to grow SOCOM or the force, rather it seeks to reprioritize 
SOF efforts towards the regional level integration. These changes are overdue, but it was 
not until a confluence of events—the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
a changing strategic environment and current support for SOF, a need and opportunity for 
increased multi-national burden sharing, and increasing U.S. fiscal austerity—allowed 
SOF to be introspective and develop feasible solutions to tomorrow’s challenges. As the 
SOCOM Commander outlined in SOCOM 2020, The Global Force of Choice, “The end 
state. . . is a SOF network seamlessly integrated into a globally networked force of 
interagency, allies, and partners able to rapidly and persistently address regional 
contingencies and threats to stability.”22 
1.   Authorities Required for Global SOF Operations 
In order to meet the GSN objectives, SOCOM has sought changes in the way that 
SOF is structured, assigned, and deployed in support of GCC’s. These changes are 
represented in a recommendation to modify the Unified Command Plan (UCP), assigning 
all SOF under Combatant Command (COCOM) to USSOCOM and further delineating 
                                                 
19 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Commander’s Estimate on Expanding”.                           
20 SOCOM ROC Drill for TSOC Baseline, Authors' Notes, USSOCOM, Tampa FL, October 17-18, 
2012. 
21 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Concept of Operations”, 1.                         
22 William H. McRaven, “SOCOM 2020: The Global Force of Choice”, sent to authors by EGSN 
OPT on 31 August, 2012, USSOCOM, Tampa, FL, undated, 9.                        
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assigned SOF under Operational Control (OPCON) to the GCC.23  Changes to the UCP 
are significant because this would make TSOC’s subordinate unified commands under 
SOCOM, rather than the GCC’s, thus finally enabling SOCOM to fully resource the 
TSOC’s. Changes to the UCP typically occur every two years, but can happen anytime as 
directed by the Joint Staff and approved by the President. But by maintaining OPCON of 
the TSOC’s, unity of command is maintained with the GCC still responsible for 
employment of SOF in theater. SOCOM recognizes in order to better meet the needs of 
warfighting commands—the GCC’s—the command relationships in the current UCP 
must be revised.24  The recommended changes are intended to develop a more agile and 
flexible force, by providing SOCOM the authority to position SOF elements around the 
globe to accelerate responsiveness to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, and 
Chiefs of Mission.25  
While SOCOM seeks authorities to position SOF elements globally, the 
employment of these forces will remain the responsibility of the GCC. Figure 2 
represents a depiction of the proposed relationship change, highlighting the supporting 
role of SOCOM to the GCC, but emphasizing the responsibility through COCOM for 
resourcing the TSOCs. Further, the figure helps to clarify SOF unity of effort by 
indicating SOF in theater have a supporting role to the TSOC’s.26    
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Optimizing TSOC Effectiveness Concept Paper” sent to 
authors by EGSN OPT on 31 August, 2012, USSOCOM, Tampa, FL, 2011. 
25 McRaven, “SOCOM 2020”. 
26 SOCOM ROC Drill for TSOC Baseline. 
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Figure 2.   Proposed relationships between SOCOM, TSOC, and GCC (After: A 
depiction based on draft from SOCOM EGSN OPT.)27                                 
2. Improve TSOC Effectiveness 
The GSN is a multi-year plan intended to enhance the overall effectiveness of the 
TSOC’s for each of the GCC’s. The GSN seeks to provide each GCC with an enabled 
SOF capability to conduct and effectively C2 SOF elements executing a full range of 
indirect and direct operations in theater.28  This initiative would allow for TSOC’s to 
respond and provide C2 for multiple lines of operations and contingencies as the 
subordinate SOF command. The GSN further seeks to improve theater special operations 
commands by “building out” their current organizational structure to increase staff and 
support personnel with regional expertise to address theater challenges through a 
synchronized SOF subordinate campaign plan.29  
                                                 
27 SOCOM ROC Drill for TSOC Baseline, The “A verbs” are 1. Assign- a relatively permanent 
placement of personnel or units under an organization; 2. Attach- a relatively temporary placement;  3. 
Apportionment- a distribution of assets as a planning start point; 4. Allocated- distribution of assets among 
competing requirements; and  5. Aligned- a non-doctrinal term-  the proper positioning or adjustment of 
assets in relation to another. 
28 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Commander’s Estimate on Expanding”, B-1.     
29 Ibid. 
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To assist GCC’s and TSOC’s in determining the required SOF capabilities and 
resources, SOCOM has conducted a series of rehearsals, called Rehearsal of Concept 
(ROC) Drills, in which they brought in the GCC and TSOC commands to determine what 
SOF capabilities the GCC’s needed for current and future missions and objectives. To 
support required (GCC validated) SOF capability increases and additional forward based 
SOF, the TSOC’s need a more robust HQ enterprise, more effective C2 of dispersed 
forces, and improved ability to manage resources.30 
The objectives of the ROC drill in October 2012 were to identify the baseline 
TSOC capability requirements, determine the optimal C2 and support relationships, and 
develop a plan of action to posture SOF forces, in order to validate requirements for 
changes needed to be successful in 2020.31  The ROC drill helped to establish a start 
point level of effort that TSOC’s need for the foundational staff and resource capability 
required to effectively conduct distributed operations and manage resources.   
3. SOCOM National Capital Region 
In addition to optimizing the TSOC’s effectiveness as part of the Expanding 
Global SOF Networks, SOCOM intends to improve the synchronization of effort across 
the broader spectrum of UGA. To accomplish this initiative, the SOCOM Commander 
directed the establishment of USSOCOM National Capital Region.32  To fully integrate 
SOF in tomorrow’s complex steady-state operating environment, SOCOM has initiated 
modifications through institutional changes at SOCOM headquarters repositioning and 
reorganizing SOCOM personnel in the NCR. SOCOM NCR’s role will emphasize 
indirect lines of effort as they relate to coordinating and synchronizing regional SOF 
campaign plans with IA and multinational efforts.33  Furthermore, this effort will 
establish mechanisms at the heart of where American foreign policy is developed, and 
along with other USG entities, develop integrated solutions to national security strategy. 
                                                 
30 SOCOM ROC Drill for TSOC Baseline. 
31 USSOCOM, “Global Scout 2011”, 2.                        
32 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Commander’s Estimate on Expanding”. 
33 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Annex C to Building the Global SOF Network: 
Establishment of the USSOCOM NCR; Operating Processes”, MacDill AFB: Special Operations 
Command, 2012, C-1.                              
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Ultimately, USSOCOM NCR will also provide a critical link between GCC/TSOC plans 
and activities to integrate operational strategy and whole-of-government approaches to 
national level decision-makers.34  
 
 
                                                 
34 CAPT Pete Phillips and Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “USSOCOM National Capital 
Region (SOCOM NCR)”, MacDill, AFB: Special Operations Command, September 5, 2012, 4.                              
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III. THE STEADY-STATE ENVIRONMENT 
The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of 
challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power 
must be applied. . . . It will be necessary to examine how this strategy will 
influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited 
resources may be better tuned to their requirements. This will include a 
renewed emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to 
deterrence and warfare.35  
   Secretary Leon E. Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global   
   Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century    
   Defense.   
Recent strategic guidance articulates a requirement for our military to do more 
with less as resources become constrained following more than a decade at war. 
Nonetheless, the security environment has become more complex as SOF is being asked 
to develop creative approaches to address regional threats, non-state actors, and 
developing security partners across the globe. This chapter will first characterize the 
steady-state environment and SOF’s role within it. The second section will address the 
regional level of SOF and how it is uniquely suited for steady-state environments. The 
final section will illustrate why Africa is a complex, steady-state environment. As the 
nation has become increasingly weary of war, the threshold for committing substantial 
U.S. military forces has become higher. However, as destabilizing regional conflict 
persists and vital national interests must be protected, the regional level of SOF will have 
an increased role in complex environments short of major conflict.      
A. STEADY-STATE ENVIRONMENT DEFINED 
The term “steady-state” is being used to characterize the future operating 
environment. This section will define and explore the steady-state environment concept 
and define SOF’s role within it. Further, this section discusses the importance of common 
understanding and lexicon in describing operational approaches in a steady-state 
environment in order to achieve synchronized effects with other government agencies. 
Currently U.S. Special Operations Forces are deployed in over 70 countries conducting a 
                                                 
35 Panetta., Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 7.        
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broad range of civil and military activities in support of Geographic Combatant 
Commanders and Department of State’s objectives. In most cases, these deployments can 
be characterized as small elements conducting a broad spectrum of military, civil, and 
humanitarian operations in what is described as a steady-state environment.    
 
Figure 3.   Steady-State Environment   (After: Pilewski, et al., in “SOF Campaigns- 
Closing a Gap in National Defense”; After: ADP 3–05 Special 
Operations.)36,37                                                                          
The steady-state environment does not imply that the system is in placid 
equilibrium or an absence of change. In fact it should be broadly viewed as an 
environment with varying degrees of stability—from stable peace to sudden crisis. In this 
sense, it takes on a much larger and more important role for military efforts than when 
viewed as merely “phase 0” of the joint operational phases.38  For the purpose of this 
paper, steady-state describes an operating environment “left of the line” or within the 
                                                 
36 Jerry Pilewski, Aaron Ressler, and Chuck Chappell, "SOF Campaigns- Closing a Gap in National 
Defense" draft article, Joint Force Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School Class 11-4, 
Seminar 8, Norfolk, VA, November 2011, 6. 
37 HQDA, Army, ADP 3-05 Special Operations, Washington D.C., August 2012, 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_05.pdf, accessed 25 October 2012, 8-9.                  
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 
D.C, 11 August, 2011, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo30082, accessed November 2012, V-6.                 
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joint operational phases of shape and deter. The line represents a threshold for 
establishing a Joint Task Force (JTF) under the authority of the GCC (see Figure 3). In 
this steady-state environment, SOF conducts a broad range of synchronized activities that 
are joint, multi-national, and interagency in nature;39 and typically under the primacy of 
the U.S. Chief of Mission who is explicitly responsible for all U.S. activities and efforts 
being conducted.   
SOF is uniquely suited to contribute to a holistic approach to address theater 
security objectives.  “Special operations are executed throughout the full range of 
military operations; however, special operations in the shape and deter phases focus on 
preventing conflict.”40  Additionally, in a steady-state environment SOF activities can be 
generally characterized as indirect.41  But steady-state implies that a range of activities 
may be conducted, and given the appropriate authorities, the level and type of activities 
are scalable. They can range from advisory to combined operations, or as a last resort to 
unilateral operations. Further, in this environment there may be no termination criteria for 
SOF and their partner nation security forces to cease activities against violent extremist 
organizations or hostile states.42  SOF activities should be enduring and may experience 
periods of unstable peace and flash points of violence. Therefore, a SOF campaign plan 
ideally equates to synchronization among SOF, other DoD and USG entities, and partner 
nation efforts. From stable peace to open conflict the level of U.S. military effort and 
focus will be determined by the level of U.S. interest (see Figure 3). 
In an environment absent major combat operations and where DoD is in a 
supporting role, military activities are described several different ways. Terms such as 
“Left of the Line,” “Phase-0 Operations,” “Indirect Approach,” “Pre-Crisis Activities,” 
“Stable State” and “Special Warfare” are being used to describe both the operating 
environment and activities short of major combat operations. Even within DoD and the 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Army, Special Operations, 3.           
41 McRaven, Posture Statement, 6.        
42 SOCCENT, “TSOC Distributed Command and Control (DC2) DCR Overview”, received by 
authors from SOCOM EGSN OPT in October 2012, U.S. Special Operations Command-Central, MacDill, 
AFB, 25 January 2011.             
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SOF community there is disparity with terms describing operational approaches in a 
steady-state environment. If such misunderstandings exist within DoD, expecting others 
within the IA to understand or support with any consistency complicates collaboration 
efforts. Common lexicon is an important issue that cannot be understated in terms of its 
impact on unity of effort where DoD terminology does not resonate with DoS, especially 
when DoS has primacy.  
 
Figure 4.   SOF Missions Applicable to Steady-State Environment (After: Global 
Scout 2011 LOE 2.)43                                        
There has been renewed emphasis on characterizing the role of SOF in steady-
state environments. Achieving near and long-term national security objectives require the 
direct and indirect approaches to theater campaigns to be successful. The role of SOF in a 
steady-state environment will increasingly be preventative in nature, such as training, 
equipping, and building partner capacity, and these pre-emptive actions are becoming a 
foundation for operational planning at the regional level.44  SOF will continue to operate 
in small, agile, and flexible elements tailored to the activity and the environment. Indirect 
efforts include security force assistance (SFA) as a main component, focusing on 
                                                 
43 USSOCOM, “Global Scout 2011”. 
44 Jacquelyn K. Davis, Statement to House of Representatives Armed Service Committee, Statement 
for the Record on U.S. SOCOM and SOF Futures Offered by Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis before the U.S. 
Congress House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities, Hearing, July 11, 2012, 1.           
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working by, through, and with partner forces. Additionally, SOF activities can also range 
from covert to clandestine, to intelligence gathering, and pre-crisis surveys and 
assessments. A recent SOCOM sponsored exercise concluded that SOF’s core operations 
contain the full range of SOF activities in a steady-state environment (see Figure 4).45  
As the GSN has established recommended changes to optimize the regional level 
of SOF, it is critical that our work defines and examines the steady-state environment. 
Over the past decade, SOF has refined and understands its military roles and activities in 
environments where DoD is in charge. However, the steady-state environment will fall 
short of major conflict and DoD will play a supporting role. Understanding the steady-
state environment will contribute to an integrated approach to working through other 
USG agencies and host nations to accomplish theater objectives.  
B. REGIONAL MECHANISMS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGNS  
Due to mission requirements, TSOCs have created and implemented additional 
doctrinal and non-doctrinal structures and mechanisms at the regional level to plan and 
coordinate with partner nations, country teams, and to provide C2 over its units. As 
previously mentioned, there is a gap in U.S. directive authority to synchronize national 
security efforts. SOCOM is a global functional command, and there are six regional 
TSOC’s. With the unique capabilities of SOF, therefore, the regional level of SOF has the 
ability to help bridge this “means” gap that has been problematic for the current IA 
structure.46  
To expand on the GSN concept, SOF can assist in bringing IA stakeholders 
together by ensuring its SOF supporting plans are synchronized with the country team’s 
plans. This section discusses how SOF achieves effects in the steady-state by framing 
activities by what Army SOF doctrine calls regional mechanisms.47  Lastly, this section 
discusses distributed operations and enduring engagements as two critical characteristics 
of SOF campaign plans.   
                                                 
45 USSOCOM, “Global Scout 2011”, 7. 
46 Davis, SOF Futures, 5. 
47 Army, Special Operations, 8.     
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1. Regional Mechanisms  
Army SOF doctrine describes the regional mechanisms of assessment, shaping, 
active deterrence, influence, and disruption, as means to frame complex problems and 
achieve operational and strategic effects in a steady-state environment:  “Regional 
mechanisms are the primary methods through which friendly forces affect indigenous 
populations, host nations, or the enemy to establish the conditions needed to safeguard 
our interests and those of our allies.”48  The application of regional mechanisms is not 
viewed as military tasks but rather operational guides for commanders and planners to 
achieve theater campaign objectives. Regional SOF organizations can help to reduce 
confusion by nesting their SOF supporting plans to the GCC’s Theater Campaign Plan 
(TSP), and in turn by nesting the SOF supporting plan to the Embassy Country work 
plans and Ambassadors’ MSRP. By tying SOF options and objectives to the GCC as well 
as to DoS country team and regional level resourcing strategies, SOF can help provide 
clarity to assist DoS and DoD in providing viable options to foreign policy objectives 
(see Figure 3).49 
2. SOF Campaign Planning 
According to Joint Publication (JP) 3–05, Special Operations, the TSOC is the 
primary theater SOF organization capable of performing broad “missions uniquely suited 
to SOF capabilities.”50  But the role of TSOC’s has changed as U.S. national policy and 
military strategy has changed. TSOC’s are not just planning for how to employ SOF in 
major combat operations; they are ideally planning, coordinating, and employing SOF in 
regional campaigns across multiple missions in areas where the Department of State is 
the lead, under mainly Title 22 authorities.  
SOF’s theater campaign plans must include integrated synchronized operational 
approaches to address global national security concerns. These campaign plans ideally 
                                                 
48 Ibid.       
49 SOCCE HOA CDR, Email to author about SOF interagency processes at the regional/tactical level, 
February 13, 2012. 
50 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 
D.C., April 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, accessed 16 July, 2012, accessed 
November 2012, III-4.          
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include multi-year requirements for authorities, funding, and forces. ADP 3–05 states 
“Missions executed by Army special operations forces may be [either] limited in duration 
or long-term campaigns with multiple lines of operations.”51  But with the emphasis on 
better interagency collaboration through SOF campaign planning, increased attention 
should be paid to on-going activities that help shape the steady-state, which has been 
described as a deliberate campaign in its own right. SOF supporting plans in a steady-
state environment encompass broad range of Title 10 and 22 activities.  
Because SOF activities will include building host nation security capacity, the 
indirect approach therefore requires increased IA integration and very deliberate planning 
and activities to shape environments before a crisis occurs. Within this context it becomes 
apparent that the indirect approach requires a SOF campaign plan. In essence, operating 
in a steady-state environment is meant to be a long duration, synchronized effort with 
other USG agencies—it is done well only through extensive and consistent coordination. 
3. Enduring Engagements and Distributed Operations 
Within the steady-state environment, regional SOF primarily accomplishes theater 
campaigns and engagements through two mechanisms: enduring engagement and 
distributed operations.52  Traditionally, SOF has executed events such as Joint Combined 
Exchange Training (JCET), Partnership Development Programs (PDP), Bi-Lateral 
Training (BILAT) events that support the GCC’s Theater Security Cooperation programs 
(TSC). Although many of these engagement events have strategic effects, they are best 
described as episodic, falling short of linking effects to a higher theater campaign plans 
or national strategy.53  Enduring engagements facilitates forward based SOF to develop 
long term and lasting relationships with host nation partners and populations. 
Additionally, enduring engagements is one way that TSOCs sustain forward presence.54  
“Enduring engagements in the geographic theaters is necessary to demonstrate U.S. 
resolve, establish legitimacy, build lasting relationships, and address long-term 
                                                 
51 Army, Special Operations, 1.           
52 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Concept of Operations”, 7.  
53 Pilewski et al., SOF Campaigns, 8.     
54 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Concept of Operations”, 8.     
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challenges.”55  Further, national strategic guidance calls for innovative solutions to 
building partner capacity and maintaining an enduring presence, and emphasizing non-
military and military-to-military approaches to reduce instability.56  This emphasis 
speaks to the capabilities of SOF’s indirect approaches to operating across the 
interagency, in austere environments with a limited presence, by working through partner 
forces to achieve national security objectives.   
The second characterization of regional SOF activities is distributed operations.  
“Distributed operations emphasize the employment of small, discrete teams in countries 
where a large U.S. military presence might be unacceptable or inappropriate.”57  There 
are a number of aspects to distributed operations that enable the TSOC’s to accomplish 
integrated long-term regional security objectives. While conducting distributed 
operations, SOF can serve a synchronization function by integrating within other USG 
and partner nation entities in a country or region.58  Distributed operations allow the 
TSOC’s to customize and position forward Command and Control (C2) or Special Forces 
liaison elements at strategic locations linking key stakeholders within the host nation and 
other USG entities.59  “Through this network of relationships, SOF can provide a hedge 
against strategic surprise by identifying and working preemptively to address problems 
before they become conflicts.”60 
To expand on the GSN concept in support of the regional level of SOF, it was 
important to highlight in this section the key characteristics of the TSOC’s that are 
critical to accomplishing theater strategic objectives in a steady-state environment. This 
section addressed regional mechanism, campaign planning, and distributed and enduring 
engagements as key aspects or characteristics of the regional level of SOF that makes the 
TSOC’s the force of choice in accomplishing strategic objectives.  
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership. 
57 Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, “Concept of Operations”, 7.     
58 Ibid. 
59 SOCCENT, “TSOC DC2 DCR Overview”. 
60 McRaven, Posture Statement, 6. 
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C. AFRICA AS A COMPLEX, STEADY-STATE ENVIRONMENT  
Africa has become a more strategically important region for U.S. national 
security. Recent White House officials have stated that North and Central Africa have 
become a top U.S. concern regarding terrorist threats to national security, with terrorist 
groups like Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) becoming better funded 
and more capable in the past few years.61  Importantly, the continent is characterized by 
the full-spectrum of peace, conflict, instability, and ungoverned spaces; from permissible 
to semi-permissible to denied areas. In part because of these reasons, SOCAFRICA was 
chosen as the case study for the thesis. Therefore, this section will briefly cover Africa to 
illustrate it as a complex, steady-state environment. This section will provide a brief 
overview of recent U.S. interest in the region and describe U.S. military activities in 
Africa, as well as difficulties in coordinating SFA efforts.  
Africa is a continent with the full range of chronic natural and man-made 
problems; extreme poverty, corruption, failing states, armed conflicts, humanitarian 
crises, and disease.62  It would be hard to overstate the degree to which these problems 
exist across the region. The threats from terrorist groups operating and collaborating in 
Africa are considered the main threats to U.S. security and the African sub-regions. In 
2010, the AFRICOM Commander testified that the threat of terror groups on the 
continent is linked to regional conflicts and instability, and the DoS sees failed states as 
“acute risks” to national security.63  The AFRICOM commander, General Ham, has cited 
serious concerns over indications that terrorists groups in Africa are seeking to coordinate 
their efforts.64  Within the past 18 months, significant events have occurred in Africa 
which have an effect on U.S. interests. For example, the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime 
                                                 
61 David Lerman, "North Africa is Central Focus in Terror War, U.S. Says," Bloomberg.com, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-31/north-africa-is-central-focus-in-terror-war-u-s-says.html  
accessed August 6, 2012.                                                                                                                  
62 Lauren Ploch, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and 
the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa”, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf, July 22, 2011.                                           
63 Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests”, 18.                                                                      
64 “Ham Discusses African Security Issues at ACSS”, transcript from Africa Center for Strategic 
Studies, Senior Leaders Seminar, http://allafrica.com/stories/201206271176.html,  June 26, 2012, Accessed 
on 28 October, 2012.                                           
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in Libya, and regimes in Tunisia and Egypt; AQIM gaining control of northern Mali this 
past spring—an area the size of France; a hostage rescue in Somalia by U.S. forces; and 
attacks on western diplomatic locations in Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, and Libya. 
U.S. strategy to counter the threats posed by transnational terrorism and 
ungoverned spaces in Africa is not solely focused on direct methods. In fact, it 
emphasizes enabling African countries to counter those threats. The June 2011 National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism states that counterterrorism (CT) efforts “must draw on and 
be closely integrated with the broader U.S. regional strategy especially since the long-
term eradication of AQIM will not be addressed by traditional CT tools alone. Long-term 
U.S. capacity building initiatives support many of the frontline and secondary states 
likely to confront AQIM.”65   
For these reasons, the military’s role in Africa is necessarily growing. The need 
for military assistance and security cooperation activities—aimed at increasing African 
states’ abilities to provide security and stability themselves—to help achieve U.S. 
national security interests, has become even more important.66  This is especially true 
given the sensitivity to and potentially destabilizing effects of U.S. military presence in 
parts of Africa. Africa can be considered a Title 22 environment, and DoD understands 
the importance of its supporting role there:  
. . . while AFRICOM has Title 10 authorities to conduct traditional 
military activities and operations, the activities that are most important to 
the department [DoD] in Africa center around building institutional and 
operational security capacity and that most of the authorities and funding 
for these activities belong to State Department programs under Title 22 
authorities.67  
                                                 
65 President Barack Obama, "National Strategy for Counterterrorism," White House, Washington, 
D.C.,  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf, accessed 10 Sep, 2012, 
16. 
66 Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests”, 19. 
67 United States Government Accountability Office, Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 
Collaboration could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa, Report to the Subcommittee on National Security 
and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, U.S. 
Govt. Accountability Office, Washington, D.C.,10-794, July 2010,  http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo9586, 
accessed on 9 August, 2012, 46. 
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AFRICOM’s main operations in Africa are its efforts in East Africa under the 
Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and in Northwest Africa with 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), the U.S. military’s supporting 
effort to the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the USG third 
priority in counterterrorism efforts.68  Both operations prioritize their efforts on 
increasing partner capabilities and fostering interoperability among nations to stabilize 
the regions. Further, they both emphasize the supporting role of the military, and the 
indirect approach to AFRICOM activities.69 
Traditionally, U.S. foreign military security assistance programs have been led by 
the State Department, and until the past decade there has been little interest within DoD, 
aside from SOF, for training foreign forces, as it was regarded neither as a military 
mission nor as an activity of more than marginal value.70  But recent national security 
strategies call for increased capacity to train foreign forces. This unified effort to build 
partner capacity is called Security Force Assistance: 
SFA is directly linked to counterterrorism strategy and is key to engaging 
underdeveloped and undergoverned nations (often referred to as “weak or 
fragile states”) in a preventive national security strategy. Regional 
combatant commanders apply this preventive strategy through authorities 
provided in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The SFA 
authorizations in the NDAA are often criticized as being disjointed and 
cumbersome, creating significant challenges to effective SFA 
employment.71  
But there is not an overarching plan for how the U.S. should carry out SFA or 
integrate efforts. A common criticism among regional IA efforts in Africa revolves 
around resourcing and funding issues. As the U.S. has begun to view this assistance as 
vital to national security, the legacy procedures for approval and implementation were 
                                                 
68 USAFRICOM, "Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara," http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp,  
accessed on November 5, 2012.                             
69 Ibid.         
70 Nina M. Serafino, "Security Assistance Reform: Section 1206 Background and Issues for 
Congress," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf,  accessed 3 October, 2012, 3. 
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seen as too slow to adequately deal with emerging threats.72  SFA is now a core military 
task, and in 2008 SOCOM became the DoD proponent for synchronizing SFA activities. 
SOCOM insists that one of the most important features needed to prevent threats “left of 
the line” is flexible funding and authorities which allow SOF to gain access and 
awareness in areas where crisis has not yet occurred. 
Given that a large part of AFRICOM’s mandate is to build indigenous 
capacity of African defense forces, the ease with which the command can 
conduct security cooperation programs will be a key to its success. DoD 
officials suggest that inefficiencies exist in authorities through which 
funding is provided for the U.S. Military’s security cooperation 
activities.73   
The range of dynamic issues and broad instability in Africa, the primacy of the 
DoS there in carrying out foreign policy, and the growing U.S. strategic interest in the 
region make Africa a good example of a complex, steady-state environment. Current U.S. 
military activities in Africa highlight DoD’s supporting role in a steady-state 
environment, with success dependent on effective IA synchronization. But deficiencies in 
the IA process have helped lead to the so-called “militarization” of foreign policy as the 
military takes on more missions which were not historically part of its core 
responsibilities.74  The next chapter will analyze SOCAFRICA, demonstrating the unique 
role of SOF at the regional level, but also arguing that the TSOC is not optimized to best 
support GCC objectives.  
 
                                                 
72 Ibid, 3. 
73 Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests”, 28. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SOCAFRICA AND SOCOM NCR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will conduct an analysis of two relatively new organizations within 
the SOF enterprise; SOCAFRICA, and the SOCOM NCR. It will analyze the 
organizational shortfalls of regional SOF through the lens of SOCAFRICA, and will 
illustrate how the GSN can improve these shortfalls, including SOF synchronization. 
Importantly, TSOC’s will be better able to operationalize SOF campaign plans, and they 
will receive top-down advocacy so that SOF priorities are not lost when their plans go 
upward. The chapter will discuss SOCAFRICA’s area of operations (AO), its roles and 
mission, strategic framework and operational approach as it relates to indirect operations.   
SOCAFRICA was chosen because it is the newest TSOC, established in 2008, 
and as a sub-unified command of AFRICOM, was established as part of a whole-of-
government focused effort at achieving national security efforts in Africa. It was meant to 
be different from traditional joint headquarters, and envisioned that subordinate units 
would be operating under Title 22 primacy, working by, with, and through African 
partners.75  SOCOM NCR was chosen because it is a primary outgrowth of the SOCOM 
Interagency Task Force (IATF), and the authors wanted to examine what, if any, 
relationship SOCOM had with the TSOC’s in terms of assisting with synchronization of 
SOF plans at the regional level.        
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AFRICA 
Outside a combat theater, however, SOF tend to be the lead military force, 
with conventional forces often providing logistics and other important 
support.76 
    Michele Malvesti. To Serve the Nation: U.S.  
    Special Operations in an Era of    
    Persistent Conflict.  
                                                 
75 Jeff McKaughan, "PARTNERSHIP BUILDER: Furthering International Relations with the Newest 
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1. Area of Operations and SOCAFRICA Formation 
Africa’s strategic importance has grown for the U.S., and the continent portrays 
the complex environment in which the U.S. will continue to address national security 
challenges. However, TSOC’s do not have adequate capabilities, capacity, or authorities 
to maximize the use of SOF at the regional level. SOCAFRICA is not optimized to fulfill 
its role because of several issues. Specifically, SOCAFRICA has challenges with 
manning; lack of assigned forces; funding processes and expeditionary logistics; 
Distributed command and control (DC2); and synchronization. This reduces overall 
effectiveness of GCC and USG efforts, and SOCOM and SOCAFRICA are taking steps 
to address these shortfalls. This chapter will examine SOCAFRICA’s roles, current 
structure and organizational shortfalls, and will illustrate how the GSN proposal can 
make improvements to SOCAFRICA.    
 
Figure 5.   AFRICOM/ SOCAFRICA Area of Responsibility (AOR) (From: UCP 
2011.)77                                                 
                                                 
77 Department of Defense, "Unified Command Plan", 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/, accessed November, 2012.   
 29 
SOCAFRICA’s area of responsibility includes 54 countries in Africa, excluding 
Egypt. The command is routinely engaged in 27 African countries working by, with, and 
through host nation counterparts to increase their capacity and provide them with 
assistance. The objective of these engagements is an Africa which is self-sustaining in a 
stable, secure environment that is unwelcoming of violent extremist groups and their 
ideas.78  When AFRICOM was stood up in 2008, it was designed as a test case to seek 
more USG interagency collaboration in making their theater plans, and carrying out its 
mission.79  In fact, USAFRICOM was touted as being the closest thing to an Interagency 
Unified Command, with numerous IA personnel working at the command. Even as 
AFRICOM has tried to emphasize the IA focus of its command, a GAO report from 2010 
states that AFRICOM has not fully engaged IA partners in planning activities and could 
better integrate its IA efforts.80 
2. Roles and Mission 
SOCAFRICA’s mission states that it “leads, plans, coordinates, supports, and as 
directed executes the full spectrum of Special Operations in the USAFRICOM area of 
responsibility as part of an integrated strategy to combat terrorism and advance 
USAFRICOM’s strategic objectives.”81  SOCAFRICA conducts the full-spectrum of 
Special Operations across a wide geographic area, with diverse social and political make-
up. The primary way it does this is to enable partners to help neutralize transnational 
threats and disrupt support for their ideology.   
The TSOC’s as organizations have not been institutionalized and their role has 
changed since they were formed. Their mission requires that they advise, plan, execute, 
and C2 multiple SOF operations, actions, and activities (OAA) over entire continents. As 
the regional level SOF organization, TSOC’s are key to attaining theater strategic 
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objectives in steady-state environments. But they have never had sufficient manning or 
resources, and are even more strained today by continuous operations in steady-state 
environments.  
The following example illustrates how the GCC’s have so many other priorities 
that there has been a sort of benign neglect in resourcing the TSOCs:  In a recent meeting 
between members of SOCOM and staff from the various GCC’s, someone from SOCOM 
asked the GCC representatives who was in charge of TSOC readiness. No one raised 
their hand.82  As previously explained, the TSOC is a sub-unified command under 
COCOM and OPCON of the GCC. By trying to gain COCOM over the TSOC’s to better 
support the GCC, “SOCOM is for the first time looking at what the TSOC is, should be, 
needs to be, and GCC’s have not been able to do that;” and neither have the GCC’s had 
the expertise to do it.83 
The role of TSOC’s has changed since they were codified in the mid-1980s, from 
a major focus as a regional warfighting and crisis-response headquarters for the SOF 
component, to an organization executing multiple long-term operations in a peacetime 
environment. The SOCAFRICA commander recently described North Africa as a model 
of the complex operating environment where flashpoints will be the norm within an 
overall “peaceful” environment. Since these complex environments are inherently 
unstable to begin with, it can be difficult to maintain an enduring presence due to political 
sensitivities where a small footprint is advantageous but the ability to move forces where 
they are needed will remain difficult.84  This is made more difficult when there are few 
assigned or readily available forces for employment.   
SOCAFRICA’s core tasks are to protect U.S. lives and interests in Africa; Build 
partner nation counterterrorism (CT) capability and capacity; and to foster and support 
the development of regional security capabilities to combat regional threats and create 
security and stability.85  It is focusing its efforts on the long-term aspects of theater 
                                                 
82 SOCOM ROC Drill for TSOC Baseline, Oct 2012. 
83 Ibid.   
84 Ibid. 
85 SOCAFRICA, interview notes from SOCAFRICA, Sep 2012. 
 31 
security objectives and the preventive nature of SOF capabilities to extend its reach to 
enable partners to degrade terrorist safe haven and disrupt illicit networks. In this regard, 
the SOCAFRICA commander’s guidance recognizes that to be successful, any effort in 
Africa must be part of a synchronized, IA approach through a sustained, enduring 
presence with partners and through understanding the environment.86   
3. SOCAFRICA’s Strategic Framework and Operational Overview 
Although OEF-TS is a high priority in the counterterrorism effort, and potential 
for crises across Africa remains high, Africa and SOCAFRICA are economy of force 
efforts. This is not to suggest it should be different, but only acknowledging the 
environment and lack of major U.S. combat operations in Africa. Additionally, since 
Africa and its under-governed spaces are so vast, the TSOC understands that it cannot be 
everywhere at once, so it should be effectively positioned on the continent. This means 
that SOCAFRICA must be able to effectively plan, synchronize, and C2 multiple 
campaigns with very few assigned forces and resources—in a politically sensitive Title 
22 environment.   
These considerations add complexity because operating in this environment 
requires constant understanding of the operational picture across the continent. Over such 
a large and dynamic area, things are constantly changing, as starkly demonstrated 
throughout North and Central Africa over the past year and a half. It adds more difficulty 
because the approach to military operations in this environment is entirely different than 
what the military is currently organized to do. To operate effectively in the above 
conditions, SOCAFRICA’s approach to operations means it needs the right tailored 
forces with enduring access in strategic places.87   
SOCAFRICA has a strategic framework which will help guide its efforts over the 
next five years. It places the most emphasis on the need to work by, with, and through 
partner nations, allies, and the IA. In their framework, Figure 6, their operational 
activities, called lines of operations (LOO), are nested vertically with AFRICOM and 
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higher strategic guidance. Their LOO’s are: to gain and maintain strategic access and 
placement; build and enable partner capacity; erode support for transnational terrorist 
organizations; disrupt violent extremist operational ability; and deny the use of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD).88 
 
Figure 6.   SOCAFRICA Strategic Framework.  (From: SOCAFRICA J5.)89                                                                    
The framework is meant to align activities horizontally by ensuring that all SOF 
operations, actions, and activities support its SOF strategic objectives (SSO). The SSO 
for SOCAFRICA are: SOF postured for future contingencies, crises, and steady-state 
activities; African partners’ ability to respond to threats is improved; to mitigate 
underlying conditions for instability; and to neutralize transnational terrorists.90 
Traditional TSOC operations were characterized by episodic engagements with 
host nation government forces, under a centralized TSOC C2 structure which provided 
guidance to forward units that executed operations. On the other hand, the complex 
environment in Africa requires a focus on sustained engagement via forward deployed  
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U.S. SOF with partner forces to help identify and prevent conflict before it intensifies;91 
and requires a more mature distributed C2 structure with formal command authorities at 
lower levels.   
In order to operationalize this into a SOF campaign, SOCAFRICA has 
emphasized that its lines of operation will focus on the indirect approach in “left of the 
line,” steady-state environments. In Figure 7, SOCAFRICA’s operational approach is 
anchored on the five tenets of regional focus against the most significant threats; work 
with willing and capable partners; focus on long term development of their capabilities; 
maintain access through enduring and episodic engagements; and synchronize efforts 
with USG organizations and partners.92  These are the most important aspects when 
considering TSOC planning and operations because it emphasizes the importance of 
indirect, long-term approaches to achieving objectives. 
Access in the above case does not mean solely access to an area, but it means 
working with the right partner, having the right permissions, or proximity to threats. 
Further, it means having SOF representation in the right places, for example in an 
embassy in a given country in order to enhance COM understanding of SOF capabilities 
or to synchronize efforts with partner nation military ministries. Access is enhanced 
through the following means:  SOF representatives in an embassy, Distributed C2 
elements for long-term operations, and Joint Planning and Advisory Teams (JPATs) to 
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Figure 7.   SOCAFRICA’s Operational Approach with emphasis on Left of the Line 
activities.  (From: SOCAFRICA J55.)93 
The means by which SOCAFRICA conducts these activities is through programs 
and authorities, enabling activities, and funding mechanisms. Programs and authorities 
refer to both Title 10 and Title 22 programs like the NDAA sections 1206, 1207, and 
1208; TSCTP, Peacekeeping operations (PKO), and counter-narcotics (CNT) 
authorities.94  Enabling activities refer to various enduring or episodic engagements like 
JCET’s, multi-national exercises, Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE), and JPATs. 
Through enduring engagement and an economy of force approach to extend their 
operational reach, the goal of SOCAFRICA is to increase interoperability of regional 
African coalitions.  
In Africa, as opposed to Europe and Asia for example, there is no broad military 
alliance in which the U.S. is involved like NATO or ASEAN.95  The African Union 
exists, but the military underpinnings and depth of U.S. military involvement is not there. 
The significant difference this represents with other regions cannot be understated. The 
military-to-military relationships have not had the basis by which to develop and mature.  
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4. Organizational Shortfalls 
The above section described SOCAFRICA’s strategic and operational vision for 
how it will accomplish its mission. This section will discuss the shortfalls in manning, 
forces, resourcing, DC2, and synchronization which make accomplishing their mission 
more difficult. To accomplish and sustain its strategic vision and meet GCC and COM 
requirements over the long-term, SOCAFRICA will need additional authorities, 
capabilities, and resources.  
  a. Manning 
Shortfalls in the numbers and training of personnel at the TSOC staff are 
the biggest challenge which bleeds over into the other shortfalls. It affects the ability to 
create synchronized SOF campaign plans, as well as its ability to provide effective C2 to 
distributed operations. Another effect is that there is general lack of SOF personnel or 
SOF expertise on the staff.96  A fully trained staff—with the regional knowledge, 
planning skills, and experience to understand other USG agencies processes—is also 
required to carry out synchronized activities.  “Man the staffs,” was the most consistent 
refrain heard when interviewing multiple staff members at SOCAFRICA. Chronic and 
organizational staff shortages for SOCAFRICA has resulted in the TSOC not being able 
to “look past its nose”—and that perspective is exacerbated by the multiple crises which 
continue to erupt in Africa.97 
In November 2011, SOCAFRICA asked AFRICOM and SOCOM to do a 
manpower study for the TSOC.98  This study is done, as needed, periodically to examine 
the role and mission of the TSOC versus the current structure. The results helped to 
create the baseline figures in the October ROC drill. The baseline requirements identified 
by SOCOM and the TSOC’s at the recent ROC drill indicates that the SOCAFRICA 
staff, and the other TSOC’s too, require approximately double their current manning in 
order to fulfill their roles and mission.99  SOCOM, understanding the importance of 






immediately augmenting personnel to the SOCAFRICA to demonstrate command 
emphasis on the subject, had committed to providing 30 additional personnel over the 
course of a few months as a temporary measure. These personnel will allow 
SOCAFRICA to “begin to look at planning operationally and strategically rather than 
only having the manpower to be reactive to each crisis.”100  
For example, the baseline TSOC manpower and functions figures 
discussed during the October ROC Drill indicate that most staff sections are severely 
undermanned according to the requirements the TSOC’s have, as validated by the GCC’s. 
The baseline figures do not yet account for mission specific aspects of each TSOC, which 
may change manning requirements slightly by function. Figure 8 is an example of the 
baseline numbers with staff functions. It shows that the largest TSOC J3 section currently 
has 68 personnel to SOCAFRICA’s 47. Both of these numbers pale in comparison to the 
baseline number reached, indicating the minimum manning needed for the SOCAFRICA 
J3—92 personnel.101  This approximate doubling of manning identified is consistent for 
the J2, J4, and J5 sections, with an almost tripling of manning required for the J6, 
Communications, section.   
 
Figure 8.   Example TSOC Baseline figures. (After: SOCOM EGSN OPT drafts, 
depicting staff functions and numbers with OCT baseline for a J3.)102                                                              
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There is a gap between the strategic and tactical levels of U.S. interagency 
planning and coordination. TSOC’s do not have the process, or forces, nor culture or 
bench depth to do operational design in depth. They are not effectively planning at the 
operational level, and as a result SOF campaign plans remain incomplete or 
unsynchronized. Although SOCAFRICA has created planning guidance and frameworks 
for its sub-regional efforts, its SOF supporting plan to the AFRICOM Theater Campaign 
Plan is incomplete. This supporting plan helps to inform how SOF will synchronize its 
effort in the regional and country work plans (See Figure 9).   
SOCAFRICA is beginning to write the SOF supporting plan and its regional 
campaign plans, which it admits are critical to synchronization, but senior TSOC staff 
stated that simply put, “the manpower gap precluded our ability to do so.”103  The TSOC 
has not had enough depth to complete development of these plans. A member of 
SOCAFRICA stated that they have been so critically short personnel that even though the 
J5 section has tripled in the past year, more are needed to begin to operationalize 
guidance and long-term plans.104     
 
Figure 9.   AFRICOM strategic guidance and plans (From: Pendleton’s GAO Report, 
Jul 2010.)105                                                               
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Staff members at SOCAFRICA described how the initial construct at the 
command was inadequate, partly due to a lack of validation of requirements for their 
manpower, which left the command understaffed from the beginning and affected their 
ability to be a learning organization.106  Further, lack of sufficient trained personnel, 
either in operational level planning or in African regional training, has also reduced its 
ability to complete SOF campaigns plans, conduct outreach to USG and partner entities, 
or to provide adequate guidance to employed SOF forces.      
  b. Assigned Forces  
Another challenge is that there are not readily available SOF on a 
consistent basis for SOCAFRICA, either assigned or allocated, to execute SOF tasks in 
support of AFRICOM objectives. In a steady-state environment, the lack of assigned or 
allocated forces directly and immediately results in degraded planning and 
synchronization. As one member of AFRICOM stated in a meeting, “most of our 
assigned forces are component HQ and staff.”107  As previously mentioned, 
SOCAFRICA has different means to conduct its OAA, like JCET’s, JPAT or CMSE. 
These can be enduring or non-persistent engagement activities, tailored to maintain 
relationships and assist in capacity building. Additionally, SOCAFRICA coordinates an 
annual exercise called Flintlock which focuses on interoperability among West African 
nations, the U.S., and allied SOF.   
Currently, SOCAFRICA has a small unit assigned to it—the Naval 
Special Warfare Unit-10 (NSWU-10), located in Stuttgart.108  Although having NSWU-
10 forward based increases the TSOC’s flexibility for rapid response, this limited 
capacity is not enough for the immense engagement efforts and crisis response capability 
needed in Africa. Further, there are not enough forces currently allocated to meet the 
GCC’s requests for SOF, reducing enduring engagement efforts. Due to lack of assigned 
forces, episodic engagements are the norm at this time. Additionally, without forces it is 
                                                 
106 SOCAFRICA, interview notes from SOCAFRICA, Sep 2012. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Bryan Purtell, MAJ, "NSWU-10 Commissioning Provides SOCAFRICA Operational Flexibility 
on the African Continent", SOCAFRICA Public Affairs, 
http://www.africom.mil/printStory.asp?art=65042012, accessed November 2012.               
 39 
hard for SOCAFRICA to do more than make plans with notional forces and be reactive to 
crises—its options are immediately limited.109  The feasibility of courses of action, or 
efforts at long-term planning, are immediately degraded without predictable allocation of 
forces, meaning synchronization with USG and other partners is made more difficult.110  
For example, in many cases, multiple JCET’s over a period of time are used for build 
partner capacity (BPC) activities in a series of episodic engagements, rather than a 
sustained effort with forces allocated to those efforts, over a multi-year SOF campaign 
plan. Since by law the JCET’s must result in U.S. SOF gaining the most training value, 
the BPC activities are a residual result of the JCET.111  Admittedly, this lack of available 
platforms is in part due to the lack of a comprehensive SFA campaign plan across the 
USG. 
The SOCOM GSN intends that more SOF units eventually be forward 
based, on an either rotational or permanent basis. Forward based in this case does not 
mean permanently located on the African continent, rather forward located somewhere in 
Europe, for example, where they would be readily available for employment by the GCC.  
  c. Resourcing - Expeditionary Logistics and Funding Streams 
In a Title 22 environment, without coordinated planning between DoD and 
DoS, the military spends considerable time trying to match proposed activities to specific 
criteria in order to use certain funds. A major weakness in SOCAFRICA’s ability to 
develop and sustain enduring engagements is the current mechanism for logistics support, 
notably U.S. military expeditionary contracting, which was described as too rigid and 
slow.112  SOCAFRICA members described the expeditionary and SOF unique 
contracting as a critical aspect to successful distributed operations, but that logistics 
support was unresponsive to, and inappropriate for, the operational environment.  
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For example, the SOCAFRICA commander recently relayed a story where 
U.S. SOF was operating with partner forces in Africa and an initial base was set up. It 
took 120 days for contracting to catch up but due to contracting requirements, they had to 
level the existing base and build a standard contracted U.S. base camp. The GCC 
commander visited and said that the base stood out too much from the surrounding area, 
and asked for additional corrections—in effect making it look more like it originally did 
during initial setup. Cost overruns resulted, while contractors were paid regardless.113  
An additional challenge is the complexity in funding streams. In a GAO 
report from 2010 AFRICOM officials stated they had a complex set of 15 different 
funding sources, with the associated legal constraints for each, affecting the ability to 
plan, resource, gain approval for, and execute partner capacity building activities in a 
timely manner.114  Most funding programs are purpose built for specific functions, and 
also most rely on an annual cycle of funding approval. The result is loss of access, 
relationships, and degraded reliability, all of which ultimately impact achieving national 
security objectives. This complexity in gaining synchronization for responsive action 
makes it difficult for SOF to use enduring engagements as part of the indirect approach: 
AFRICOM’s special operations command officials said that the lack of 
sustainable funding sources has created a short-term, unsustainable 
approach to the command’s activities, describing their efforts as sporadic 
connections with African countries with which they should have enduring 
relationships.115 
With shortfalls in its ability to combine operational effects with 
predictable resourcing and funding, SOCAFRICA has created what it calls a programs 
officer, which is distinct from but related to the J8 resourcing functions. This position is a 
staff officer with operational experience who ties the command’s supporting activities 
and efforts by country and region, to funding requirements like a 1206 proposal.116  A 
remaining challenge of this process is translating these capabilities and requirements into 
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how the intended effects support the goals of the Chiefs of Mission, in turn resulting in 
synchronization and permissions. This shortfall means the TSOC needs to develop a 
better way to ensure the CoM’s understanding of and approval for how the TSOC can 
support their goals. This effort will need a robust and dedicated staffing effort in order to 
effectively submit and gain the appropriate funding authorities for operations and 
activities.  
Successfully operating in Africa means that the logistics footprint, 
especially non-SOF support, is of paramount consideration. This may also mean looking 
at ways to use existing infrastructure like other allied bases to further reduce U.S 
footprint. Finally, conducting distributed operations focused on long-term effects requires 
a more accessible, flexible funding stream for SFA activities “left of the line.”  
  d. Distributed C2  
At the recent TSOC ROC Drill at SOCOM, the commander of U.S. Army 
Special Operations Command (USASOC) stated that command and control is the number 
one challenge for SOF, and this is due because of how it is organized.117  Additionally, 
SOCAFRICA conducts its operations over a highly dispersed area—a continent—with a 
small staff, even smaller C2 elements, and sporadic force allocations. It lacks the ability 
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Figure 10.   Tyranny of distance. The size of Africa in perspective. (From: Nathan 
Yau’s “The True Size of Africa by Kai Krause.”)118                                         
At SOCAFRICA, the “tyranny of distance” refers to the vast distances in Africa 
which strain the ability to conduct effective C2, as well as the infrastructure necessary to 
conduct enduring engagements (Figure 10). There is little supporting infrastructure for 
even basic U.S. military functions, including safety functions like medical evacuation and 
personnel recovery means. SOCAFRICA has identified the need for physical access and 
limited infrastructure on the continent. These needs are driven by strategy, guidance, 
partner, and threat considerations, focusing on minimum presence for expeditionary 
forces, and flexibility through small, decentralized operating and support locations.119 
The TSOC has determined that in order to adequately address security issues in 
Africa, it must have access to small nodes throughout the continent—described as lily 
pads—in order to effectively C2 its activities. There are three key elements to what 
constitutes force posture, and that is forces available, footprint, and agreements allowing 
access. The considerations determining these elements are the cost of the posture; 
operational considerations like DoD strategy and missions; political-military dynamics; 
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and host nation support.120  Access, permissions, and supporting infrastructure are 
needed to support activities left of the line, allowing for proximity to partner forces and to 
threats. This in turn allows for more effective information sharing with partners, and 
provides more awareness to the U.S. The command has described these small nodes as 
varying levels of scalable support locations with little to no permanent presence, or non-
enduring locations which can be quickly used if needed to support engagement or 
contingency activities.121  The need to be correctly postured is crucial to mission success 
and to meeting theater objectives. 
SOCAFRICA has several subordinate elements that provide C2 of its forces 
operating in Africa. One of these is the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara 
(JSOTF-TS).  “A JSOTF is a joint task force (JTF) composed of SO units from more than 
one Service, formed to carry out a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a theater 
campaign or other operations.”122  “A JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the TSOC 
staff or an existing O-6 level HQ from an existing SOF component with augmentation 
from other SOF or conventional units and/or personnel as appropriate.”123  JSOTF-TS is 
an organization which precedes SOCAFRICA, and was originally formed by SOCEUR to 
support OEF-TS when North Africa was in the EUCOM AOR. One of the problems with 
this organization is that it is not forward based in a position where it can effectively C2 
those forces, since it is located in Germany. It has outgrown its role in Germany, and 
further, SOCAFRICA does not think that the doctrinal JSOTF is the optimum construct 
for a Title 22 environment.124 
But small forces constantly rotating into a multitude of engagement activities 
across vast regions requires a C2 node proximate to dispersed forces in order to provide 
DC2. Further, those C2 nodes need the right command authorities and capacity to 
conduct C2 to meet the SOCAFRICA commander’s intent. A non-doctrinal concept has 
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emerged, called a Special Operations Command-Forward (SOCFWD), which has the 
ability to provide continuity of effort in key locations where SOF operate. These C2 
nodes can allow the TSOC to integrate its SOF campaign plan at the sub-regional level 
among several country teams and host nations, and would relieve the current dependence 
on tactical units conducting policy-level engagements for the TSOC.125  Finally, this 
empowered C2 node can provide the continuity needed to focus efforts on “left of the 
line,” preventive activities.  
 
Figure 11.   SOCFWD key functions. (From: SOCCENT’s “TSOC DC2 DCR 
Overview.”)126                                                                                 
A SOCFWD is a good example of how operational adaptation far outpaces 
doctrine—the concept was conceived around 2007 at SOCSOUTH to enhance distributed 
command and control and has been used at other TSOC’s, even though it is not resourced 
as a doctrinal requirement.127  A SOCFWD is not pre-defined or task focused like a 
JSOTF, but is mission-tailored and scalable (see Figure12). For example, an 06 could 
command a SOCFWD with just a few personnel, depending on the type of mission and 
the necessary interaction with USG and partner nation representatives, or a SOCFWD 
could be commanded by an 05 with several dozen or more personnel. With emphasis on 
their ability to engage proactively with other U.S. and host governments, focusing on the 
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indirect approach, SOCFWD’s would ideally be situated in key strategic locations with 
the ability to carry out SOF campaigns.  
 
Figure 12.   SOCFWD: scalable, tailorable.  (From: SOCCENT’s “TSOC DC2 DCR 
Overview.”)128                                                                      
SOCAFRICA envisions that the JSOTF-TS construct will eventually be replaced 
by one or more SOCFWDs which will allow the command to focus on long-term 
missions through a whole of government approach.129  This non-doctrinal, small 
footprint approach to an operational level capability is being applied in other TSOC 
AOR’s. With additional manning and access, SOCAFRICA intends to implement this 
DC2 concept within its region over the next five years. 
  e. Synchronization  
SOCAFRICA plans, coordinates, and operates across a vast region among 
dozens of countries and country teams. Its ability to create understanding for how SOF 
will contribute to achieve effects, and then coordinate those efforts vertically and 
horizontally is a monumental undertaking. As the above sections have demonstrated, 
there is a cumulative effect to the lack of authorities, capabilities, and resourcing which 
amounts to misunderstanding of the TSOC’s roles, and lack of support and approval for 
TSOC efforts. Ultimately, when plans go upward and outward, how does the TSOC 
prevent the SOF aspects from being lost?  
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For SOCAFRICA, the interface for IA synchronization is mostly at the 
GCC level. But while AFRICOM is manned to conduct IA coordination, staff members 
there state that the intent of the IA construct within AFRICOM has not worked as well as 
intended.130  SOF roles and responsibilities are not well understood among USG agencies 
at the operational-regional level, but neither does the TSOC staff always understand the 
roles and functions of USG or partner nation agencies,  which can lead to difficulty in 
coordination and gaining support.131   
There are several ways in which SOACAFRICA tries to synchronize its 
plans and activities, but admittedly it is limited in its scope and ability to do so. Since 
there are no regional USG organizations with directive authority across agencies, the 
closest being the country team, SOCAFRICA must attempt to maintain influence and 
support from individual country teams. SOCAFRICA has tried to do outreach via 
communities of interest—like an IA conference or a sub-regional conference with 
specific Country team deputies. In both cases there was a lack of interest by the DoS to 
attend, in part due to confusion with the TSOC role within the GCC as representative of 
DoD efforts.132  Unfortunately too, rank absolutely matters, and SOCAFRICA is headed 
by a one star officer. That rank alone is far outweighed by 53 ambassadors, and the 
numerous general and flag officers at AFRICOM.   
How would the GSN help improve synchronization for SOCAFRICA?  It 
would do this in three ways. First, the additional manning with trained personnel will add 
depth to the command’s ability to operationalize campaign plans while addressing sub-
regional and country specific issues, in effect translating SOF’s capabilities to the country 
work plans. Second, with 53 countries in the AO, it is difficult for the command to 
conduct adequate outreach to all of them. As the TSOC is on average engaged in 27 
countries, even this is difficult to provide the Country teams with adequate understanding 
of SOF’s capabilities. The top down advocacy that the SOCOM NCR can provide will 
help to gain DoS understanding and awareness of the TSOC’s mutually supporting 
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capabilities. Finally, the prioritization of the TSOC’s as a force of choice, and 
acknowledging that SOF has unique capabilities within the DoD “Defense” role of the 
3D’s, will elevate interest and participation in TSOC regional level communities of 
interest within the IA.   
As demonstrated, a more robust manning effort to allow for SOF 
campaigning, distributed C2 nodes, and increased outreach can help with synchronization 
of efforts between the TSOC, USG, and partners. Better articulation of SOF capabilities 
and intent will increase understanding and support. The SOCOM NCR will serve an 
important role in helping to provide synchronization, or top-down advocacy, which could 
allow the TSOC to focus its IA efforts on the operational and tactical level of 
coordination. 
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND- NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, USSOCOM identified a 
requirement to establish a collaboration mechanism and information exchange process to 
better support the ensuing global war on terrorism.133  USSOCOM recognized the 
additional need for enduring engagement across the globe as a means to address these 
threats, and it further understood the importance for synchronization among U.S. 
Government organizations. As result, SOCOM established the IATF and Special 
Operations Support Teams (SOST).   
While the IATF remained at SOCOM Headquarters at MacDill AFB, the Special 
Operations Support Teams would filter out to more than 25 government agencies 
predominately situated in the NCR.134  The function of the SOST was to provide 
USSOCOM representatives the ability to communicate with and access to key 
stakeholders within other USG agencies to provide necessary information for timely 
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action.135  The stated purpose or mission of SOCOM’s IATF was primarily 
counterterrorist focused and concentrated on the direct approach line of effort.136   
Beyond the traditional methods of disrupting enemies by direct operational 
approaches, SOCOM determined that a broader approach to address the global complex 
environment would require integrated solutions spanning across all instruments of 
national power. SOCOM’s intent is to improve the synchronization of effort across the 
broader spectrum of U.S. Government agencies to facilitate both direct and indirect 
approaches. In concert with other elements within the USG, “the indirect approach will 
be critical in the fight to deter, disrupt, and deny sanctuary to our enemies.”137   
After recognizing that the current SOCOM IATF construct was not effectively 
suited to address long-term synchronized planning and coordination, the SOCOM staff 
reassessed their IA processes. The assessment identified a gap occurring between the 
strategic policy levels and the executing components in the field. SOCOM NCR was 
therefore the evolution of the IATF construct. SOCOM NCR will be the command’s 
“focal point” within the interagency to help coordinate and synchronize SOF operations 
with IA and multinational efforts, emphasizing the indirect approach.138  Additionally, 
SOCOM NCR will organize around functional lines and will be regionally focused to 
better support the priorities of the Geographic Combatant Command and the TSOC’s 
campaign plans.139  The SOCOM NCR will synchronize theater operational and tactical 
tasks to national strategic goals through strategy and plans. This effort will promote unity 
of effort linking the theater operational and tactical plans to national strategic objectives 
increasing the overall operational effects.140     
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Figure 13.   SOCOM NCR IA process in support of the TSOC.  (From: SOCOM EGSN 
OPT.)141                                          
SOCOM NCR will consolidate and organize around six functional lines that 
ultimately enable effective interagency collaboration and planning in support of the 
GCC’s and the regional level of SOF.142  The Strategic Integration Division (SID) has 
the primary function to develop collaboration strategies focusing on the indirect lines of 
effort at the operational and strategic level. The Interagency Senior Advisory Group 
(ISAG) will have a primary function of linking senior IA personnel with SOCOM NCR 
leadership. The SOST will remain spread throughout the IA performing day-to-day 
liaison and coordination support. Connecting with Department of Justice and other 
Federal law enforcement agencies, the Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center 
(NTC) will support a law enforcement line of effort and planning. The remaining 
divisions, the Irregular Warfare Support Team (IWST), and Mission Support Group 
(MSG), perform a supporting role of technical, administration, rapid equipment testing 
and procurement, and technical or policy requirements.143    
What does USSOCOM NCR mean for the Geographic Combatant Commanders 
and the Theater Special Operations Commands?  First, it will synchronize theater 
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operational and tactical tasks to national strategic goals through strategy and plans. 
Figure 13 above illustrates SOCOM NCR’s interagency process working within a 
mechanism that integrates national strategic guidance with theater strategies. Ultimately, 
this mechanism is not merely a de-confliction apparatus, but one that works in concert 
with the GCC’s to provide senior decision-makers and other senior government officials 
with SOF employment options.144  These SOF options are then transformed into 
authorities and funding to execute theater SOF plans and contingencies. Finally, the 
SOCOM NCR will primarily bridge the gap between the strategic level and tactical level. 
It will have the capacity to assist TSOC’s and GCC’s in coordinating long duration 
campaign plans in support of regional and country objectives.145   
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V. TSOC’S – THE FORCE OF CHOICE 
In order for the TSOC to be serious as a force of choice for the GCC, we 
need to do rigorous internal analysis to determine structure and 
capabilities in detailed numbers . . . to ensure transparency, consistency, 
standardization, and compatibility.146  
    SOCOM ROC Drill for TSOC Baseline—OCT 2012 
 
A. IMPLICATIONS TO IMPROVING TSOC’S  
As we have shown through analysis, TSOC’s have been sub-optimally manned, 
resourced, and equipped over the past decade. The recent attack on the U.S. consulate in 
Libya further highlights the shortcomings in regional level USG coordination as well as 
the lack of available forces to respond quickly to crises—demonstrating the that 
improvements at the regional level are required.147  Through the GSN concept, SOCOM 
has established a road map to optimize Theater Special Operations Commands. However, 
the GSN alone is not capable of implementing the necessary changes; it will require 
commitment and continued support from the individual services, the GCC’s, and from 
Congress.   
The following implications will need to be addressed in order to achieve the 
requirements described by the GSN: Updated command relationships; Force management 
required for TSOC expanded capabilities; Doctrinal updates which institutionalize the 
requirements for resourcing; Training and education of the force; Forward posture of 
SOF; and Implications for improved interagency synchronization. It is too early to 
determine all of the implications for optimizing TSOC’s. Although this section does not 
address all of the implications for full implementation of the GSN, the intent of 
addressing those listed in this chapter is to stimulate further discussion and encourage 
additional research.  
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Manning has consistently shown to be the biggest chronic shortfall in reducing 
TSOC effectiveness. To underscore the importance and complexity of the implications of 
manning, SOCOM has established a Global Force Management (GFM) element headed 
by a two star General to determine and oversee changes needed for training, education, 
and manning of the force in general.148  This section addresses three distinct implications 
that are characterized under Personnel Management. These include proper manning, 
talent to task, and career incentives. The first, shortfalls in the number of personnel 
assigned to the TSOC staff, affects among many other things the ability to create 
synchronized SOF campaign plans and DC2. Proper manning not only includes numbers, 
but placing the right person in the right job. With the concept of distributed C2 as a key 
piece of successful enduring engagement and more effective regional TSOC’s, in 
addition to the acknowledged need to get the right trained personnel to the TSOC’s, the 
question of how those personnel will fit into the current personnel and billeting 
management system must be addressed. To address personnel management in SOF,  the 
GFM will establish priorities to address how these jobs are looked at with regard to 
career management. This will require service modifications.149  
 The second aspect is tracking individuals that possess the right skills for the right 
position in what is referred to as “talent management.”  Under current officer personnel 
management, the seemingly singular focused “command track” mindset within the Army 
and SOF community provides limited options to many of the mid-level field grade 
officers. As a result, SOF officers can become disenfranchised by a single tracked system 
and ultimately go on to pursue other career options. In early 2012, the human resources 
management organization responsible for Army Special Forces officers said that it was 
180 percent over strength on Majors. But it is clear from this thesis that there are many 
positions that will need to be filled, in most cases once they are codified. During a recent 
congressional testimony, Linda Robinson states, “Top flight talent, including the best 
planners and a variety of expert enablers, are needed to craft the SOF campaigns and 
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interact with the broader GCC staff and country teams in the region.”150  She goes on to 
state, “TSOCs need to be the place where top staff go rather than be seen as a career-
ending assignment.”151 
In order to truly capitalize on officer management, SOF must provide incentives 
and alternative career paths that provide officers promotion opportunities in addition to 
“command.”  This type of change would involve a departure from service centric 
priorities for personnel management and career paths, which currently do not reflect the 
requirements for SOF specific position in support of GSN. For example, commanding a 
recruiting battalion, a current priority for Army SF officers, is not the best use of 
available personnel. Additionally, expanding the pool of senior field grade officers for 
availability in the coming years is an important but challenging requirement. U.S. Army 
SOF management will require a different approach that provides other avenues for SOF 
officer to have greater opportunity for promotion to the 06 levels.    
The next implication is the need for updated SOF joint doctrine, and for adequate 
planning processes within the IA. Doctrine codifies constructs currently in use, like a 
SOCFWD or an institutionalized TSOC construct, which helps drive requirements. Joint 
Publications do not address GSN concepts or describe TSOC’s as Joint Task Force 
capable Headquarters.152  Joint Doctrine requires updates to support staffing and 
planning for SOF Campaign plans. The second is a need for doctrine supporting steady-
state distributed and enduring engagements. One aspect of the distributed operations is 
the concept of DC2. The current C2 mechanism for the TSOC’s distributed C2 of SOF is 
a JSOTF or a series of JSOTF’s. In doctrine, JSOTF’s are manned out of TSOC organic 
resources, but in reality a series of on-going JMD fills is required, often by untrained, 
short-term personnel. The nature and limited mission scope of the JSOTF make it 
unsuitable for “left of the line,” steady-state operations, which need a tailored, discreet, 
and enduring presence under a broad mission focus.153  Doctrine fails to address the 
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concept of DC2 or institutionalize concepts like the SOCFWD in terms of its ability to 
provide scalable and enduring structures to support SOF in a steady-state environment. 
Current SOF doctrine, specifically JP 3–05 and 3–05.1, discusses SOF C2 structures and 
operations in environments where DoD is the lead agency. It does not consider operations 
and structure required for the steady-state environment.154  
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of establishing common SOF 
lexicon across the IA. The degree to which this causes problems is immense. Not only 
does the lack of common lexicon cause confusion. Many of the terms that SOF and DoD 
use, for example, Phase 0, Campaigning, and pre-crisis activities—and the connotations 
of what they may imply—cause deep-seated apprehension among other USG agencies.155  
This is not merely a matter of organizational culture. This directly results in lack of 
support and reduced willingness to collaborate. The difference between how those terms 
are used and understood within DoD, and how they are perceived elsewhere, must be 
reduced. SOCOM and the TSOC’s should develop official publications and conduct 
outreach, to ensure that SOF and its partners understand the specific terminology. This is 
especially needed to explain regionally specific terms differ which necessarily differ 
among TSOC’s or from a standardized term.156    
As a result of the implementation of the GSN, the Theater Special Operations 
Commands will eventually see an increase in manning. These commanders and staff 
personnel will require additional training with regional knowledge, planning skills, and 
experience to understand other USG agencies processes to synchronize and integrate 
efforts, to carry out indirect activities in steady-state environments. Currently, SOF does 
not have a reliable means to produce SOF campaign planners—the ability to plan, 
understand, and interact at the operational and theater strategic level.157  This will require 
a change with Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) specific to SOF. In one 
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example of how SOCOM is working to fix this, an agreement was recently reached 
between SOCOM and the Joint Staff that will allow for JPME 2 training to be conducted 
in-house at SOCOM. This will allow for more SOF specific joint training. The intent is to 
allow mid-grade field officers to receive this joint training prior to arriving at TSOC’s, 
giving the critical planning and education required to work there.158,159  
The allocation and availability of forces to the TSOC has several implications 
which will need to be addressed. The SOCOM Commander has stated that good order 
and discipline issues in theaters have put SOF credibility and professionalism at risk 
because SOF forces operating in theater do not have loyalty to the TSOC’s.160  This 
circumstance is due in large part because the TSOC’s do not have a reliable way to 
influence the behavior of those forces, as most often the engagements are episodic in 
nature and the personnel within those elements are rated by their originating 
headquarters. By solidifying the apportionment of forces to TSOC’s, this will create a 
habitual and more accountable relationship. Second, the basing of allocated forces, either 
on a rotational or permanent basis, will require further research. There are simply not 
enough SOF units in the TSOC portfolio. The GSN intent to push more SOF forward 
should alleviate this issue. But the political acceptability in the U.S. and for a given host 
country, for losing and gaining an American unit, respectively, could be a contentious 
process. Additionally, factors such as costs and long-term viability of basing locations 
will require further consideration.      
Currently, IA collaboration occurs in some form at the tactical and strategic levels 
of the government. However, an IA synchronization gap exists at the regional level.161  
The future operating environment will require a synchronized approach. Although IA 
implications are not tied to the success of the GSN, it is inherent to the success of 
achieving national and theater security objectives across the globe. In this vein, a civilian 
led regional or sub-regional U.S. structure, with directive authority, could allow the 
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National Security Council to focus on strategic level policy, and would provide a real 
integration mechanism at the regional level.162  Organizational initiatives include a 
common IA planning process or IA handbooks that communicate best practices and 
formal processes.   
B. THESIS CONCLUSION  
The U.S. will continue, and most likely increase, its stability, security, and 
counterterrorism operations. Despite perceptions, U.S. Special Operations Forces do not 
just conduct activities that culminate with direct action. Recent USSOCOM commanders 
have made clear the emphasis on prioritizing indirect approaches. The long-term focus of 
SOF operations, the small, sustainable footprint of its forces, and the several unique 
capabilities it offers to African partners and to the country teams makes it a force of 
choice to support U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa. However, TSOC’s, and more 
broadly the regional level of U.S. foreign policy, have been neglected for too long. In 
1996, the former SOCOM Commander, General Shelton, wrote that TSOC’s have come 
of age since fixing the organizational and resourcing issues of the TSOC’s.163  He may 
have been correct when he wrote that back then the role of the TSOC was as an episodic 
engagement and crisis response—those issues therefore still need to be fixed. In fact, they 
have been exacerbated by chronic under resourcing and confusion of command 
relationships. Further, the complexity of the environment has made the stakes higher for 
U.S. security. A disconnected regional SOF headquarters has serious impacts on reduced 
U.S. synchronization. The GSN is a workable concept which provides greater capability 
and synchronization to the regional level of U.S. goals. The risk of not fully 
implementing the GSN will have negative impacts on U.S. ability to address threats 
preventively, and will degrade efforts at burden sharing among multinational partners. 
This would reduce the reliability and credibility of SOF with U.S. and foreign 
partners.164   
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This thesis is about the regional level of SOF, the TSOC’s, and how their 
organizational shortfalls need to be addressed in order to support theater objectives in 
increasingly complex, steady-state environments. Focusing on the regional level 
highlights a significant mismatch of USG decision-making authority within IA efforts—
the regional focused GCC and the bilateral, country-focused embassies. The importance 
of this is that the future operational environment will continue to place great demand on 
SOF, while also depending on improved synchronization across the IA. Recent strategic 
guidance stresses the need for innovative, agile, and small footprint approaches to 
meeting these objectives. SOF has the unique skills and the organizations suited to 
conduct preventive activities in a steady-state environment. But for TSOC’s there remain 
shortfalls in capabilities and resourcing which reduces the effectiveness of SOF’s 
contribution to theater objectives. SOF is addressing how it needs to be postured as part 
of the Joint Force in 2020. The thesis addresses this topic through an analysis of 
SOCAFRICA and its role as the TSOC in the AFRICOM AOR, and through an 
examination of the SOCOM GSN concept as it seeks to improve TSOC effectiveness. In 
a steady-state environment, operations at the regional level are broadly characterized by 
three things; Department of State primacy; emphasis on the indirect approach to 
activities, focusing on working by, with, and through partner forces; and a security 
environment ranging from peace to unstable peace, to flash points of conflict. Finally, it 
highlights organizational shortfalls of SOCAFRICA which must be addressed to make 
SOF a reliable capability at the regional level, and the implications stemming from these 
changes which should be considered in order to allow these changes to succeed. 
New authorities and capabilities are needed as well. Changing the UCP to give 
COCOM authority of the TSOC to SOCOM, with OPCON to the GCC will allow 
SOCOM to meet its global responsibilities to train, equip, and man SOF. By positioning 
more SOF forward it will increase the availability and responsiveness of SOF for GCC 
employment. Institutionalizing TSOC’s will allow for proper manning, resourcing and 
will clarify SOF unity of command in theaters, giving TSOC’s the depth of experienced 
manpower to conduct SOF campaigning, focusing on long-term activities left of the line. 
This is where they will achieve operational and strategic effects in support of GCC and 
broader USG objectives. The series of on-going SOCOM ROC drills is achieving a 
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baseline of TSOC capability requirements, validated by the GCC’s, for improved 
manning, available forces, and responsive funding and logistics support. The validated 
requirements indicate a need to almost double the manpower at TSOCs. 
SOCAFRICA is an excellent case for study as it is a new organization and 
because Africa demonstrates the complexity of steady-state environment. SOCAFRICA 
is demonstrative of TSOC shortfalls—the recent ROC drill indicates a need to 
approximately double to manning of each TSOC. The requirement for supporting DoD 
efforts in Title 22 environments will increase, not decrease. At the regional level, in 
Africa, U.S. objectives are focused on security and stability through building partner 
capacity, and these missions all rely on a more indirect approach to protect the U.S. and 
its interests. By studying SOCAFRICA, the thesis illustrated how chronic organizational 
shortfalls in manning, assigned forces, resourcing, ability to C2 distributed operations, 
and synchronization, has resulted in degraded SOF ability to support the GCC and Chiefs 
of Mission.     
In order to implement changes to improve the TSOC’s there are implications 
which require institutional recognition and support by organizations affected by the GSN, 
including SOF service components, other DoD organizations, and USG entities. Changes 
in policy and doctrine, personnel management, training and education, and organization 
will ensure that TSOCs have the resources to meet mission requirements in the 2020 
environment. The changes listed in the thesis and in the GSN will not happen 
immediately, but over the next five to seven years. It will require concerted and dedicated 
effort to complete these changes. SOF must address its current shortfalls at the regional 
level, or it will be less able to plan and synchronize special operations efforts in 
theaters.165  An improved TSOC will support national security objectives through 
synchronized efforts, forward forces, and small footprint approaches to activities, making 
them the regional force of choice for the GCC.  
 
                                                 
165 Ibid.                
 59 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Averett, Christian M., Louis A. Cervantes, and Patrick M. O’Hara. “An Analysis of 
Special Operations Command-South’s Distributive Command and Control Concept.” 
Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. Accessed February 
2012.http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA475840.  
CDR, SOCCE HOA. Email Communication about SOF Processes in the IA at the 
Regional Execution Level with Woolshlager, Richard S. Dated Feb. 13, 2012.  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. 2012 Army Posture Statement, Washington, DC: HQDA, 
2012. Accessed 5 August, 2012. 
https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/pages/St
rategicContext.aspx.  
Davis, Jacquelyn K. Statement for the Record on U.S. SOCOM and SOF Futures Offered 
by Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis before the U.S. Congress House of Representatives 
Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities 
Hearing July 11, 2012. July 11, 2012. Accessed  
Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3–05 Special Operations. Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. April 2011.  
Expanding Global SOF Network OPT, USSOCOM. “Annex C to Building the Global 
SOF Network: Establishment of the USSOCOM NCR; Operating Processes.” 
MacDill AFB: United States Special Operations Command, 2012. 
———. “Building the Global SOF Network: Establishment of a USSOCOM 
Coordination Element in the National Capital Region (Base Order).” MacDill, AFB: 
USSOCOM, March 2012. 
———. “Commander’s Estimate on Expanding Global SOF Network.” MacDill, AFB: 
United State Special Operations Command, November 4, 2011. 
———. “Concept of Operations for the Global Special Operations Forces Network.” 
MacDill, AFB: USSOCOM, October 2, 2012. 
———. “Executive Summary: Establishment of a USSOCOM Coordination Element in 
the National Capital Region.” MacDill, AFB: USSOCOM, 2012. 
———. “Optimizing TSOC Effectiveness Concept Paper.” MacDill, AFB: United States 
Special Operations Command, 2011. 
———.  “USSOCOM National Capital Region (SOCOM NCR).” MacDill, AFB: Special 
United States Operations Command, September 5, 2012. 
 60 
Feickert, Andrew. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for 
Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. July 15, 2011. 
Accessed 10 October, 2012. http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=682416 
———. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress 
June 26, 2012. Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, June 26, 2012. 
Joint Forces Staff College. “Joint & Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) JPME II.” 
National Defense University. Accessed 25 Oct, 2012. 
http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jcws/default.asp . 
Lerman, David. “North Africa is Central Focus in Terror War, U.S. Says.” 
Bloomberg.com. Accessed 08/06, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012–07–
31/north-africa-is-central-focus-in-terror-war-u-s-says.html  
Livingston, Thomas K. “Building the Capacity of Partner States through Security Force 
Assistance.” Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service. May 5, 2011. 
Accessed Aug 2012. 
http://www.cq.com/advancedsearch.do?dataSource=crsreports&dispatch=createadva
nced.  
Malvesti, Michele L. “To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of 
Persistent Conflict.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security. June 
2012. Accessed Sep. 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a529991.pdf   
McKaughan, Jeff. “PARTNERSHIP BUILDER: Furthering International Relations with 
The Newest Special Operations Command.” SOTECH 6, no. 6, August 2008. 
Accessed September 2012. http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-
archives/58-sotech-2008-volume-6-issue-6/438-qaa-brigadier-general-patrick-m-
higgins.html 
McRaven, William H. Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture 
Statement of the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, before 
the 112th Congress, March 6, 2012. 
———. “SOCOM 2020: The Global Force of Choice.” MacDill, AFB: United States 
Special Operations Command, 2012. 
Panetta, Leon E., Secretary of Defense. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership : Priorities 
for 21st Century Defense. Washington, D.C: Dept. of Defense, 2012. Accessed 




Pendleton, John H, GAO. Testimony before the Subcommittee on National and Foregin 
Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interagency 
Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DoD’s Southern and Africa Commands. 
House of Representatives. Accessed June 2012. 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA525458  
Phillips, Peter, and Corcoran, Charles. “Harnessing America’s Power: A U.S. National 
Security Structure for the 21st Century.” Joint Forces Quarterly no. 63 (4th qtr 
2011, 2011), 37. 
Pilewski, Jerry, LCdr, Aaron Ressler LtCol, and Chuck Chappell LTC. “SOF Campaigns- 
Closing a Gap in National Defense.” Draft article, Joint Force Staff College, Joint 
and Combined Warfighting School Class 11–4, Seminar 8, Norfolk, VA, November 
2011. 
Ploch, Lauren. “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. 
Military in Africa.” Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2007. 
Accessed July 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf  
Purtell, Bryan, MAJ. “NSWU-10 Commissioning Provides SOCAFRICA Operational 
Flexibility on the African Continent.” SOCAFRICA Public Affairs, Accessed on 10 
Nov, 2012. http://www.africom.mil/printStory.asp?art=6504. 
Robinson, Linda. Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities. Testimony on Special Operations Forces. House 
of Representatives, July 11, 2012. Accessed August 2012. 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=18aff57a-6bbf-4091–
85d7–4cc80c64a5b6 . 
Serafino, Nina M. “Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) Summary and Issue 
Overview.” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. August 2012. 
Accessed October 2012. http://www.cq.com/pdf/crsreports-4138958 . 
———, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towell. “Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for 
Missions Abroad Key Proposals and Issues for Congress.” Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. December 22, 2011. Accessed 
September 2012. http://www.cq.com/pdf/crsreports-4008205 . 
Shelton, Henry. “Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Commands.” Joint Forces 
Quarterly, Winter 1996–1997. Accessed Feb. 2012. 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/scampi/citations/gsa/162137/94746.html   
Siegel, Robert. “General: CIA Responded Quickly to Bengahazi Attack.” National Public 




SOCAFRICA, interview notes on SOCAFRICA by MAJ Richard Woolshlager. 
Conducted at SOCAFRICA HQ, Germany, from 24–28 September, 2012.  
Special Operations Command-Africa. “SOCAFRICA Strategic Planning Guidance 
2012.”  Overall document classified SECRET. Stuttgart, Germany, 2012. 
Special Operations Command-Central. “SOCCENT SOC(FWD) Organizational 
Architecture DCR.” MacDill AFB: SOCCENT. 2011. 
———. “TSOC Distributed Command and Control (DC2) DCR Overview.” MacDill, 
AFB: SOCCEN T, 25 January 2011. 
USAFRICOM. “Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara.”  Accessed November 2012, 
http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp  
United States Army. ADP 3–05 Special Operations. Washington, DC: HQDA, August 
2012. Accessed November 2012.  
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_05.pdf   
United States Government Accountability Office. Report to the Subcommittee on 
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform. Defense Management Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 
Collaboration could Strengthen DoD’s Efforts in Africa. House of Representatives. 
GAO. Accessed May 2012. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo9586  
USSOCOM IATF. Interagency Task Force: Thinking Ahead, Pushing Forward. 
Information Handbook on the IATF. MacDill AFB: USSOCOM, 2010. 
USSOCOM J7/9-F, Wargame Branch, and Team CACI. “Global Scout 2011 Limited 
Objective Experiment 2 Final Report.” MacDill AFB, USSOCOM. August, 2011. 















INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, VA 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
3. CDR, USASOC 
 U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
 Fort Bragg, NC 
 
4. HQ U.S. Special Operations Command - Africa 
 ATTN:  Chief of Staff, COL Franck 
 APO, AE 
 
5. United States Special Operations Command 
 Expanding Global SOF Networks OPT 
 ATTN: COL Stu Bradin 
 MacDill AFB, FL 
 
 
